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ABSTRACT
A fine-grained provenance-based access control policy model is proposed in this paper, in order to
improve the express performance of existing model. This method employs provenance as conditions
to determine whether a piece of data can be accessed because historical operations performed on data
could reveal clues about its sensitivity and vulnerability. Particularly, our proposed work provides
a four-valued decision set which allows showing status to match a restriction particularly. This
framework consists of target policy, access control policy, and policy algebras. With the complete
definition and algebra system construction, a practical fine-grained access control policy model is
developed.
1 Introduction
Data provenance logs historical operations performed on documents to protect their security and privacy. Provenance
Access Control is considered to be an important research topic of big data security. The sensitivity of files and their
provenance may vary, and users may request and be granted access to files and provenance separately. In some cases,
provenance itself may contain sensitive information that may require more protection than the attached document. For
instance, while a programming project can be published to the public, its authors and operations should be kept secret
to prevent technology leaks. Therefore, access control is required for the provenance data itself. It allows qualified
users to access provenance data and protects it from unauthorized access. Provenance can be expressed as a directed
acyclic graph (DAG), illustrating how the data artifacts are processed. In such a provenance DAG under the Open
Provenance Model (OPM)[4], nodes represent three main entities, including Artifact, Agent and Process, and edges
represent connections to the main entities.
Several provenance-based access control policy models [5][7] and history-based access control [6] have been proposed.
Park et al.[7] proposed a family of provenance-based access control models which utilised a notion of dependency as
the key foundation for access control policy specification. They proposed a basic provenance-based access control
model PBACB , which facilitates additional capabilities beyond those available in traditional access control models
by introducing provenance as access control conditions. Based on the basic model PBACB , a family of PBAC models
was defined by extending three criteria, which are (1) the kind of provenance data in the system, (2) whether policies
are based on acting user dependencies and object dependencies, and (3) whether the policies are readily available
or need to be retrieved. The three models PBACU , PBACA and PBACPR extend one of these three criteria
respectively. However, combined results for individual policies are only basic conjunctive or disjunctive connectives
between rules.
However, previous provenance-based access control policies have not solved some problems. The research of partial
matching of provenance map is not deep enough so that the existing work does not implement the appropriate fine
grained strategy model. The research of partial matching of provenance map is not deep enough. Partial matching a
provenance graph is a scenario where not all elements of a provenance subgraph can be found in the given provenance
graph. For example, let a policy condition be: a doctor diagnosed a patient at 22/4/2018. The partial matching
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scenario could be that a doctor diagnosing a patient, but the timestamp is not 22/4/2018 or missing. It is important to
propose a mechanism to introduce partial matching provenance graph, and values showing the partial matching state
should be given in a fine-grained policy model. From this point, policies algebras to merge those partial matching
values are also missing from the existing work.
To tackle the problems mentioned above, we propose a framework based on OPM+, which is composed of three
types of atomic targets policies proposed by us. Path atomic target policy only takes attributes from provenance. The
determination is based on whether certain operations that are recorded in provenance have been performed on the
data. Associated atomic target policy takes attributes from both provenance and requests (subject, object, etc.), which
implies that the determination is based on whether the requesters have performed operations on the data. The latter
atomic targets perform differently from traditional access control. For instance, an associated atomic target could
express such a scenario: if the requester was editing a file before and have not submitted it, the access is permitted.
Notably, for this scenario, the “requester” is the subject of a query, and the editing and submitting are processes from
a provenance. At last, the attributes from requests can also be defined as conditions, which is named as request atomic
target. A fine-grained provenance-based access control framework consists of policy models, policy evaluation, and
policy algebras. The contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We propose three types of atomic targets policies: path atomic target policy, associated atomic target policy
and request atomic target.
• We define a “four-valued” decision set for each atomic target (conditions). The attribute triple is replaced as
a provenance partition, which can express a series of historical operations.
• We rearrange logic operators and create several new operators to combine atomic policies.
2 System Assumption
To establish the framework of provenance-based access control model and policy algebras, we propose a system
assumption shown in Fig1, where the system consists of four parts including Administrator, Server, Data Producers
Data Visitors and Data Storage, which we will illustrate in the follwing.
Figure 1: System Assumption
• Administrator generates provenance-based access control policies and sends them to the Server.
• Server collects policies from administrators and (optional) data producers. The server evaluates results based
on the policies and delivers the results to databases.
• Data Producers generate files and attached provenance which are sent to Data Storage. They might also
produce self-defined access control policies and send them to the Server.
• Data Visitors send queries to the Database in order to access files stored in the database.
• Data Storage stores files and provenance, which receives queries from users and responds to queries accord-
ing to the results generated by the Server.
In a provenance-aware system, access control policies can be generated by system administrators and data owners.
When a data visitor sends a request to a server to access a piece of data, the server needs to retrieve the provenance
of targeted data as the policies are tailored to make access decisions based on data provenance. After receiving results
from the server, the database implements the results by approving or rejecting users’ requests. It can be noticed that
most access control mechanisms take evaluations based attributes from queries or current system conditions. While
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for provenance-based access control policies, conditions and restrictions can be extended to provenance which logs
historical operations of data.
3 Target Policies
The provenance-based access control framework consists of access control policies and policy algebras, where each
policy consists of target section and access control section. Each provenance-based access control policy consists of a
target section and an access control section. The target section confines applicable requests of each policy. The policy
can affect the request, only if the objective provenance graphs in a request meet the conditions of Target. In addition,
the access control section evaluates the accessibility of the request. We give definitions of syntax for targets.
Figure 2: The framework of Proposed Provenance-based
Access Control
Figure 3: OPM+ Schema
Definition 1 (Open Provenance Model+(OPM+)) is an extension of OPM, which records how is a piece of data
derived. The model is defined by a triple <T, L, G>:
• T is the vertex types: agent (Ag), artifact (A), process (P) and attribute (Att). Each vertex in a provenance
graph is one of these types. In Figure 2, an artifact is represented by the shape of oval, which is an object or
as a piece of data, such as “homework1”, “comments”, and etc.; a process is an action which is the operation
executed on a piece of data, such as “submit” and “review”; an agent is a subject that sponsors an action
including “user1” and “professor”.
• L is the relationship labels: used (u), wasGeneratedBy (wgb), wasControlledBy (wcb), wasTriggeredBy
(wtb), wasDerivedFrom(wdf) and hasAttributes (ha). Each edge in a provenance graph will be labeled as one
of these labels. The Labels describe the relationships between the vertices.
• G is a labelled DAG, where G = <V, E>, E defines the allowable relationships between the elements, E = {
(P, A, used), (A, P, wgb), (P, Ag, wcb), (A, A, wdf), (P, P, wtb), (Ag, Att, ha), (P, Att, ha), (A, Att, ha) }
Given the OPM+ <T, L, G>, an OPM+ instance is defined by a provenance graph Gi = < Vi, Ei >, where Vi is a set
of entities and Ei ∈ Vi × Vi × L. Let τ : Vi → T be a function that maps an entity to its type, we say Gi is valid if for
each entity v ∈ Vi, τ(v) ∈ T, and for each edge (v, v′, l) ∈ Ei, (τ (v), τ (v′), l)∈ E. We extend the definition of OPM
in paper [1].
Definition 2 (Attribute Node) The extended provenance model attaches context information as attribute nodes in DAG,
where each attribute node consists of attribute items and attribute values. For instance, let Attributei for a process
be {timestamp: 1/5/2017; system condition: Linux; location: Sydney}. In this model, provenance can be classified
into base provenance data and (optional) attribute provenance data that is associated with main entities in the graph
(ag, p, or a). Attribute provenance data is classified into three categories: Agent-related Attributes, Process-related
Attributes, and Artifact-related Attributes.
• Agent-related Attributes: Agents trigger and execute operations, and their attributes include IDs, activated
roles ect. Identities are usually unique labels to identify users. Activated roles are the roles users employ
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by taking actions and can play a key role in distinguishing the sensitivity of content and in making access
decisions. For instance, when Alice adds a piece of data into a document in the role of teaching assistant, she
grades assignments of students. The comments and scores can only be accessed by Alice and the owner of
assignments. While when Alice edited data with a role of student, the content of assignments can be read by
other students enrolled the same subject.
• Process-related Attributes: Processes are operations performed on data and result in the change of data, their
related attributes include temporal aspects when operations are performed, such as locations, timestamps,
system conditions etc. They can influence access decisions. For example, operations in provenance can be
accessed if they were executed before 2016.
• Artifact-related Attributes: Artifacts are objects including input messages, output messages, and source data.
The related attributes can include object size, permitted usages defined by the data producers etc. Some meta-
data that might normally be recorded as attributes may not be held in this way in provenance data, as they are
recorded within the structure of a provenance graph. For example the generating agent and time of data.
Definition 3 (Path Atomic Target). We define four types of atomic targets from provenance graphs:
-nullT is a target;
-(vtype, vname) is a target, where vtype is a vertices type and vname is a vertices name;
-(vtype, vname, a, f) is a target, where v is a vertices, a is an attribute value and f is a binary predicate.
-a target is a string of (vtype, vname) or (vtype, vname, a, f) expressed over XPath.
-(vtype, vname, x, f ) is an alternative type of atomic target, where (vtype, vname) is a vertices, x is an attribute in a
query, and f is a binary predicate.
First, the atomic target models are named as path atomic target, as they extract elements from provenance. A signal
vertex can be viewed as an extreme form of a provenance path. An atomic target could be one or a string of quaternions,
which illustrates a dependent path. vtype is the type of a vertex, which is one element in the set of V∗ = {Ag ∪ A ∪
P}.
vname is an element in a finite set of abstracted names for vertices, where an abstracted name expresses a class of
vertices names. For instance, User is the abstracted name for all the users including user1, user2 etc. In terms
of the motivation for using abstract value names in policies, provenance is captured after provenance-based access
control policies are defined, and provenance evolves as the file grows. Therefore, the exact names of vertices can be
infinite and unpredictable. Therefore, it is difficult for policy generators to predict specific names for all vertices, and
we use abstract vertex names in provenance-aware policies. In provenance-aware systems, provenance graphs can
be interpreted as Typed Provenance Model (TPM) [9] for policy checking purposes,which bridges the gap between
policies and provenance graphs. In TPM, vertex names are interpreted as abstract names or vertex class names.
a is an attribute for vertices. The extended provenance model OPM+ stores context information as attribute nodes in
a provenance DAG. Under this model, provenance can be divided into basic provenance data and (optional) attribute
provenance data associated with main entities in the graph (ag, p, or a). Attribute provenance data is divided into three
categories: Agent-related Attributes, Process-related Attributes, and Artifact-related Attributes.
In quaternion Qua = (vtype, vname, a, f), f is a binary predictor. Binary predictors have five possible values: 6,
<, >, >. Also, since equality (=) is adopted most frequently, we assume equality is the default value and can be
omitted from the atomic targets. For example, let a quaternion be (Agent, User, Female, =). In the example, Agent
is the vertices type; User is the abstracted vertice’s name in a graph; Female is an attribute for the vertices; and =
is the binary predicate. Namely, a user vertices of type Agent with female attribute matches this atomic target. For
another example, (Process, Submit/wasSubmittedBy, 1/1/2016, <) is a quaternion, and a process named “Submit” or
“wasSubmittedBy” executed before 1/1/2016 matches it.
A dependency path can be not only a single vertex in the source graph, but also a string of connected vertices, which
represent a set of operations performed on a piece of data. Whether a provenance is composed of given dependency
paths can be defined as a condition in the access control policy, since provenance-based access control determines
whether a piece of data is accessible based on whether certain operations are performed on the data. We propose a few
simple samples to illustrate what provenance-based access control policies can do:
(1) An exam paper can be downloaded if it has been reviewed at least three times but not graded;
(2) A paper can be accessed if it has not been submitted;
(3) A file can be accessed if it was generated originally before 2016 and was reviewed after 2017;
(4) If a piece of data was revised by Alice in 2016, and never been edited by Bob, then it can be accessed by students;
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The examples above are sample provenance-based access control policies that make access decisions based on certain
operations recorded in provenance. One or a series of operations can be defined as a provenance path in policies.
Particularly, in certain scenarios, a predefined dependency path may list only a few vertices in a string, such as the
starting point and ending point of a provenance path. Thus, it solves problems where it is difficult to predict all vertices
in a provenance path. For example, let a dependency path be (vi, \v+, vj , \v{2}, vk). It presents a path starting at
vertices vi, followed by several other vertices, regardless of the number of them and of vertices vj . The path ends at
vk, where there are two vertices between vj and vk.
Directed DPATH is connected by all types with the CT, where the processes in a path are presented in a timing
sequence. Thus, by identifying the directions of labels that connect the vertices, it ensures that operations are executed
according to time order in a directed DPATH .
3.1 Policy Evaluation
With respect to the evaluation of the atomic target relative to the request, the atomic target matches the query if the
provenance graph satisfies all the attributes in the atomic target. Otherwise, it does not match the atomic target.
We start with the request atomic target, as it takes the form as a single value. When the attribute in a query satisfies
the value of attributes, the result is 1T ; otherwise, the result is ×T .
Because the model of path atomic target and joint atomic target adopt the same form. Together we explained their
evaluation principles. We hope there exist values of a result to represent the conditions between a full match or
complete not match. Hence, we present a four-valued result set DecT = {1T , 0T ,⊥T ,×T } for the evaluation, where
1T is absolute match and ×T represents completely not match. There is 1T > 0T >⊥T> ×T .
(1) The “null” target matches all requests, which implies it returns 1T for all objective provenance graphs.
(2) If the provenance graph contains vertices with the vertex type and name, the target (vtype, vname) matches, and
the vertex type and name return the value of 1T . However, when vname does not match, it returns ⊥T ; When neither
matches, it returns ×T .
(3) When the quaternion (vtype, vname, a, f ) or (vtype, vname, x, f ) is met, it returns 1T ; if it only matches vtype
and none of the other three values match, it returns 0T . If the provenance graph only meets (vtype, vname) but not the
value, it returns ⊥T ; ×T denotes that it does not contain the vertex v in the graphs.
(4) Dpath is quaternion of (vtype, vname, a, f ) or (vtype, vname, x, f ) defined by a string of nodes, when it meets all
quaternion, it returns 1T ; It returns 0T if it meets all the vtype, vname in the string but not the other two values; If only
all vtype is satisfied, it returns ⊥T ; It returns ×T when the provenance DAG can not meet all the vtype in the string.
We denote the evaluation of a given request q as [[t]]T (q) ∈ DecT . We utilise the subscript T to indicate that it is an
evaluation of the target to distinguish the results of target section from that of the access control section. However, the
subscript can be issued without ambiguity. Initially, a query for null target returns 1T , and an evaluation for a query
with empty provenance graph returns ×T . [[ null ]](q)=1T ; [[n]](∅)=×T
A more fine-grained provenance-based access control policy model is proposed by defining and evaluating atomic
targets. In this model, different types of attributes extracted from a provenance graph are distinguished. Namely, the
four values in the decision set represent the case where a provenance graph satisfies different categories of elements in
the atomic target.
3.2 Operators
A target section may consist of several atomic targets organized under a tree structure. In a tree structure, leaf nodes
are atomic targets and non-leaf nodes are logic operators that combine the results of each atomic target to output a
final decision.
The operators are tailored for our proposed four-valued decisions set, including binary operators, unary operators,
and u-ary operators. We introduce binary and unary operators [2], which correspond to the weak and strong Kleene
operators [8] of the four values target decision set {1T , 0T , ⊥T , ×T }, and define several new operators. We define
operators not t, opt t, t1 and t2 and t1 or t2 of targets as follows:
[[ not t ]](q)= ¬ [[ t ]](q); [[ t1 and t2 ]](q)=[[t1]](q) u [[t2]](q)
[[ opt t ]](q)= ∼ [[ t ]](q); [[ t1 or t2 ]](q)=[[t1]](q) unionsq [[t2]](q)
Here, not t and opt t are unary operators. The total order of DecT is that 1T > 0T > ⊥T > ×T . In binary operator
and, the result is the lower value between the two sides. To the contrary, or outputs the higher values from the two
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inputs. However, if we change the DecT order as ×T > ⊥T> 0T > 1T , and (in 1T > 0T > ⊥T > ×T )= or (in ×T
> ⊥T> 0T > 1T ).
X ¬X ∼X ?X
1T 0T 1T ⊥T
0T 1T ⊥T ×T
⊥T ⊥T 0T 1T
×T ×T ×T 0T
Table 1: Unary Operators
unionsq 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
1T 1T 1T 1T 1T
0T 1T 0T 0T 0T
⊥T 1T 0T ⊥T ⊥T
×T 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
Table 2: Binary Operator unionsq
Hence, when we change the priority order for the values in theDecT set, we can enumerate all the operators as and for
the orders 1T > 0T > ×T >⊥T> (∪), 1T >⊥T> 0T > ×T (∩), 1T > ×T >⊥T> 0 (@), 0T > 1T >⊥T> ×T (∧),
0T > ×T >⊥T> 1T (∨), ×T > 1T > 0T >⊥T (⊃), ×T >⊥T> 0T > 1T (⊂), ⊥T> ×T > 0T > 1T (`) and
×T > 1T > 0T >⊥T (a).
u 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
1T 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
0T 0T 0T ⊥T ×T
⊥T ⊥T ⊥T ⊥T ×T
×T ×T ×T ×T ×T
Table 3: Binary Operator u
∪ 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
1T 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
0T 0T 0T ⊥T ×T
⊥T ⊥T ⊥T ⊥T ⊥T
×T ×T ×T ⊥T ×T
Table 4: Binary Operator ∪
∩ 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
1T 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
0T 0T 0T 0T ×T
⊥T ⊥T 0T ⊥T ×T
×T ×T ×T ×T ×T
Table 5: Binary Operator ∩
@ 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
1T 1T 0T ×T ⊥T
0T 0T 0T 0T 0T
⊥T ⊥T 0T ⊥T ⊥T
×T ×T 0T ⊥T ×T
Table 6: Binary Operator @
∧ 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
1T 1T 1T ⊥T ×T
0T 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
⊥T ⊥T ⊥T ⊥T ×T
×T ×T ×T ×T ×T
Table 7: Binary Operator ∧
∨ 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
1T 1T 1T 1T 1T
0T 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
⊥T 1T ⊥T ⊥T ×T
×T 1T ×T ×T ×T
Table 8: Binary Operator ∨
⊃ 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
1T 1T 0T ⊥T 1T
0T 0T 0T ⊥T 0T
⊥T ⊥T ⊥T ⊥T ⊥T
×T 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
Table 9: Binary Operator ⊃
⊂ 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
1T 1T 1T 1T 1T
0T 1T 0T 0T 0T
⊥T 1T 0T ⊥T ⊥T
×T 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
Table 10: Binary Operator ⊂
` 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
1T 1T 1T 1T 1T
0T 1T 0T 0T 0T
⊥T 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
×T 1T 0T ×T ×T
Table 11: Binary Operator `
a 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
1T 1T 0T ⊥T ×T
0T 0T 0T 0T ×T
⊥T ⊥T 0T ⊥T ×T
×T ×T ×T ×T ×T
Table 12: Binary Operator a
In addition, the target can be composed of a group of atomic targets {t1, t2...tn,}, combined with these operators. For
the target expression, the binary operators have the same priority and run the same priority operators from left to right.
Binary operators take priority over an unary operator, but operators in brackets should be calculated first.
¬ (t1 ∧ t2 ∩ t3 ∪ t4)
∼ (¬t1unionsq ∼ t2 ∧ (t3 ∩ t4))
In the first expression above, the calculation should start from the operators in brackets. If there are no brackets, it
should start with the unary operator ¬. Since the operators inside of the brackets are binary, they are calculated from
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left to right, then, calculating ¬ is last. In the second expression, it is obvious that the sub-expression inside of the first
bracket should be calculated first. ¬t1, ∼ t2 and t3 ∩ t4 need to be calculated first, as an unary operator and operators
in brackets take priority. Then, unionsq and ∧ combine results of both in brackets, which is taken as ∼ in the end.
A solid target in a policy can be represented as constructs of trees with nodes, where leaf nodes are atomic targets
and non-leaf nodes are logic gates. We employ a policy tree structure to combine these atomic targets. The lower
expression above was illustrated in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4: Target Tree A Figure 5: Target Tree B
The result of the target expression indicates whether a policy matches a given query. Only 1T ∈ DecT for target
evaluation represents that the policy is applicable. More formally,
-If t evaluates to 1T , it evaluates p;
-If t evaluates to 0T , ⊥T and ×T it stops further evaluation.
However, to make the expressions more concise, we define u-ary operators, which executes on more than two atomic
elements. The and and or pair for multi-elements are4 and5, corresponding to unionsq and u in binary operators. They
inherit the same DecT priority order as unionsq and u, which is 1T > 0T > ⊥T > ×T . For 4, it selects the highest value
among candidates. While5 takes the lowest value among candidates. For instance,4[1T , 0T , ⊥T , ×T ]= 1T ,5[1T ,
0T , ⊥T , ×T ] = ×T .
Although the u-ary operators can be translated into a series of binary operators, it makes the atomic tree structure
briefer and reduces the numbers of operators by combining many binary operators as one. Therefore, to demonstrate
the u-ray operators, we provide an example under the tree structure in Figure 4.6. In this example, u-ary operators are
used to combine atomic target as: 5[t1, t2, t3, t4, t5];4[t6, t7, t8, t9].
3.3 Target Equivalence
For two targets t1 and t2, if for all requests, the evaluation are always the same, [[ t1 ]](q)=[[ t2 ]](q), then t1 and t2 are
equivalent targets, [[ t1 ]] = [[ t2 ]]. We show following priorities of our target operators.
Proposition 1 ∀ t and t’,
[[¬(¬t)]]=[[ t ]]; [[∼ (∼ t)]]=[[ ∼ t ]]
[[∼ (¬t)]] 6= [[¬(∼ t)]]
[[¬(t unionsq t′)]] 6= [[(¬t) u (¬t′)]]; [[¬(t u t′)]] 6= [[(¬t) unionsq (¬t′)]]
[[∼ (t unionsq t′)]]=[[(∼ t) unionsq (∼ t′)]]; [[∼ (t u t′)]]=[[(∼ t) u (∼ t′)]]
Proof The above equations can be proven by checking the four-valued “truth” table defined by operators.
Proposition 2 ∀ t1, t2 and t3......tn,
4[t1, t2, t3] = t1 unionsq t2 unionsq t3;
5[t1, t2, t3] = t1 u t2 u t3;
4[t1, t2...... tn] = t1 unionsq t2 unionsq...... tn;
5[t1, t2...... t3] = t1 u t2 u...... t3;
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Proof The above equations can be proven by checking the four-valued “truth” table defined by operators.
3.4 On functional Completeness
We wish the operations we defined to express all functions that users would like to define. Therefore, we prove ∀f :
DecnT → DecT , n∈ Z∗, where f can be expressed by at least one combination of ¬, ∼, ? and ∪. This property is
proven by the logic expressions defined by ¬, ∼, ? and ∪ over DecT is functional completeness. We prove this by
introducing a theorem from Jobe [3].
Theorem 1 (Jobe) 1962 The three-valued logic E expressed over the set 1,2,3 and defined by the operators •, E1 and
E2, given in the figure below, is functionally complete.
• 3 2 1 E1 E2
3 3 2 1 3 1
2 2 2 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 2 3
Table 13: Over the Set {3,2,1}
• 1T 0T ⊥T ×T E1 E2 E3
1T 1T 0T ⊥T ×T 0T 1T ⊥T
0T 0T 0T ⊥T ×T 1T ⊥T ×T
⊥T ⊥T ⊥T ⊥T ×T ⊥T 0T 1T
×T ×T ×T ×T 1T ×T ×T 0T
Table 14: (Over Set {1T , 0T , ⊥T , ×T }
Theorem 2 J-operators and functional completeness.[3] In order to present a new and simple proof of functional
completeness, we define the operators Jk(P1, P2, ...Pn)l, which have the following interpretation. Jk(P1, P2, ...Pn)l
represents the truth table of a possible formula of order n which has the truth value k in the ith row and the truth value
1 in all other positions, where (1≤k≤M) and (1 ≤ i ≤Mn).
Corollary 2 Logic operations ∪, ¬, ∼, and ? is functionally complete for expressions over four-valued set {1T , 0T ,
⊥T , ×T }.
Proof Based on the theorem in Jobe’s paper[3], the operators we tailored for our four-valued set is functionally com-
plete.
4 Access Control Policy
When the target section is evaluated to be true, this indicates that the request is within the effective range of the policy.
In the access control section, we still employ partitions in provenance as atomic conditions. The access control policy
section determines that the access request can be allowed/denied if the provenance graphs contain certain provenance
partitions in the policy. Based on both target section and access control section employing provenance partitions as
conditions, the model of atomic condition takes the same form as the atomic target. However, the difference is that
each section may take different provenance partitions as conditions.
Here, we formally define atomic conditions. Let {1P , 0P ,⊥P ,×T } ∈ DecP is a decision set;
- p ∈ DecP is an atomic condition, where p is a value in the decision set;
- a provenance partition is an atomic condition;
- (t →p{tag}) is a policy; and t is an atomic target, where  is ≺ or  (≺ and  are two approaches to transform
atomic target as atomic condition);
- (∗t →p{tag}) is an atomic condition; where ∗ is a logic unary expression over an atomic target, and  is ≺ or ;
- p1 • p2 which is a conjunction policy of p1 and p2, where • is an operator connection two atomic conditions;
- pbdP p permit by default policy is a policy p, where pbdP can be treated as an operator to map a four-valued decision
set to a two-valued decision set (Yes or No);
- dbdP p deny by default policy is a policy p, where pbdP can be treated as an operator to map a four-valued decision
set to a two-valued decision set (Yes or No);
Similarly, with the target section, we still utilise a tree structure to organise atomic conditions. The tree structure
enables proper visualisation of a policy and supports a flexible and powerful combination of atomic conditions. Even
though atomic conditions employ different provenance partitions, they take the same model to extract elements from
provenance. Atomic conditions could be provenance partitions already existing in the target section or in newly
defined provenance partitions. To be more specific, atomic access control policies could recall conditions in target
to reduce redundancy. Their conditions could be re-used as a form of transformation which will be introduced in
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the later part of this section. So it becomes apparent that the atomic access control policies could also define new
provenance partitions as conditions. The following two truth tables define how to re-use the transformation of atomic
target policies as atomic access control policies. Atomic targets are forwardly or adversely referred to a value in the
four-valued decision set {1P , 0P , ⊥P , ×P }. Just as the tables shown below, the transformation takes the form as
t →p{tag}, and the {tag}∈ {1, 0,×,⊥}. When t is referred to p forwardly, the tag × keeps the results of t; ⊥ changes
×T and ⊥T as ⊥P ; 0 changes ×T and ⊥T and 0T as 0P ; 1 increases all the values as 1P . On the contrary, 1 for
inverse reference keeps values of t; 0 decreases 1T as 0P ; ⊥ decreases 1T , 0T as ⊥P ; and ⊥ downgrades all values of
t as ⊥P .
t ≺ p 1 0 ⊥ ×
1T 1P 1P 1P 1P
0T 1P 0P 0P 0P
⊥T 1P 0P ⊥P ⊥P
×T 1P 0P ⊥P ×P
Table 15: t ≺ p
t  p 1 0 ⊥ ×
1T 1P 0P ⊥P ×P
0T 0P 0P ⊥P ×P
⊥T ⊥P ⊥P ⊥P ×P
×P ×P ×P ×P ×P
Table 16: t  p
Moreover, to support all the possibility of references for the atomic target, atomic targets can be transformed by unary
operators before referred to p, which takes the form of ∗t →p{tag}. We show an example of logic expression over t in
Table 17 as: ∼ (¬t), where t ∈ {1T , 0T ,⊥T ,×T }.
t ∼ (¬t)
1T 0P
0T ⊥P
⊥T 1P
×T ×P
Table 17: t→∼ (¬t)
∼ (¬t) ≺ p 1 0 ⊥ ×
1T 1P 0P 0P 0P
0T 1P 0P ⊥P ⊥P
⊥T 1P 1P 1P 1P
×T 1P 0P ⊥P ×P
Table 18: ∼ (¬t) ≺→ p
∼ (¬t)  p 1 0 ⊥ ×
1T 1P 0P ⊥P ⊥P
0T 1P 1P 1P 1P
⊥T 1P 0P 0P 0P
×T 1P 0P ⊥P ×P
Table 19: ∼ (¬t) → p
t ?(¬(?t)) ∼ t ¬t
1T 1T 1T 0T
0T 0T ⊥T 1T
⊥T ×T 0T ⊥T
×T ⊥T ×T ×T
Table 20: All Orders of a “Four-valued” set by ¬ and
∼
Lemma 1 ∀t ∈DecT , ∗t →ptag supports all the possibilities for (t, p), where  is ≺ or , ∗ is unary expressions over
¬ and ∼.
Proof ∗t →p is functionally completed, as ∗t can express all the order for a four-valued set and  takes both forwardly
and reversely. We firstly list all the orders of a four valued set via ¬ and ∼.
Therefore, we can conclude the functional completeness of ∗t →p.
A conjunction of policies is a policy. The motivation to define pbdPP and dbdPP is that we need to transfer a
four-valued decision set to a two-valued result (permit or deny access). However, it could be processed by combining
results of all applicable policies. This transferring can be defined by each policy, or each system can define pbdP or
dbdP as the default process. A permit by a default policy returns 1P if the output of P is 0 or 1; while it returns ⊥P
otherwise. On the contrary, a deny by default policy returns 1P if the output of P is 1; while it returns⊥P if the output
of P is 0 or ⊥P . We define the truth table of both as below.
P pbdPP dbdPP
1P 1P 1P
0P 1P ×P
⊥P 1P ×P
×P ×P ×P
Table 21: Truth Table for pbdPP and dbdPP
9
Figure 6: Example Policy Trees
∼ (t1 ∧ t2) ∪ (¬(4[t3, t4, t5]))
¬ (t4 ≺ p1 ∨ t5  p2) ∩ (∼ p3 unionsq ((¬t2 → p4) ∩ p5 )
In Fig 6, we provide a policy example which includes target policy and access control policy. For this example, atomic
target t2 t4, and t5 was assigned as atomic conditions by t4 ≺ p1, t5  p2, and ¬t2 → p4.
Clearly, the frameworks of the paper titled PACLP: A Partition-Based Access Control Policy Language for Prove-
nance” and this paper introduce provenance partitions as conditions of policies. However, in provenance access con-
trol policies, the decision set is a two-valued. And we defined a four-valued decision set for provenance-based access
control policies. Because that provenance-based access control policies mainly depend on attributes of provenance as
conditions. The access control policies is to access provenance. Hence, the evaluation for provenance partitions is
more fine-grained, where we employ a four-valued decision set in the framework.
4.1 Policy Operators
The operators defined in the previous section can be used for access control policy tree structure. In the policy tree
structure, logic operations are non-leaf nodes in the policy trees. Here, we introduce two operations inspired by the
operators provided by Crampton and Morisset [2]. Compared to other operators we proposed, the operators that we
define here are aware the orders of inputs. Namely, when the orders of two inputs switch, the output is not always the
same.
⊕ 1P 0P ⊥P ×P
1P 1P x 1P 1P
0P y 0P 0P 0P
⊥P 1P 0P ⊥P ⊥P
×P 1P 0P ⊥P ×P
Table 22: Idemponent
⊕∪ 1P 0P ⊥P ×P
1P 1P 1P 1P 1P
0P 0P 0P 0P 0P
⊥P 1P 0P ⊥P ⊥P
×P 1P 0P ⊥P ×P
Table 23: Idemponent ⊕∪
⊕∩ 1P 0P ⊥P ×P
1P 1P 0P 1P 1P
0P 1P 0P 0P 0P
⊥P 1P 0P ⊥P ⊥P
×P 1P 0P ⊥P ×P
Table 24: Idemponent ⊕∩
. 1P 0P ⊥P ×P
1P 1P 1P 1P 1P
0P 0P 0P 0P 0P
⊥P 1P 0P ⊥P ⊥P
×P 1P 0P ⊥P ×P
Table 25: First-applicable
We list the truth tables for ⊕, . and / as above. In Table 18, the outputs are no longer symmetrical at two sides of the
diagonal, where inputs of {1P , 0P } and {0P , 1P } differ. For ⊕, the priority of four valued sets are 1P = 0P > ⊥P
> ×P . Here, we employ ∪ and ∩ to decide x and y when 1P meets 0P . In particular, ⊕∪ takes the former one as the
result, while ⊕∩ takes the latter one as the result. Based on ⊕, we can define more operations with the priority order s
such as 1P > 0P = ⊥P > ×P , 1P = ⊥P > 0P > ×P etc.
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/ 1P 0P ⊥P ×P
1P 1P 0P 1P 1P
0P 1P 0P 0P 0P
⊥P 1P 0P ⊥P ⊥P
×P 1P 0P ⊥P ×P
Table 26: First-applicable
Similarly, . is another logic operator that is aware of the order of inputs, and . emphasises the first input. When the
first input is 1P or 0P , it covers the second input and was outputted as the result. While, when the first input is ⊥P ,
the second input is the result. / effects with the opposite rule by emphasising the second input.
4.2 A case study
In order to better deliver the idea, we generate a sample policy and a provenance graph. Thus we output a result of the
policy based on the provenance graph.
Atomic Target Policy Section:
Atomic Target (1): Bob uploads a piece of data
and Alice submits it;
Atomic Target (2): The data was reviewed on Monday and
was graded at 30/5/2018;
Access Control Policy Section:
Atomic Condition (1): Bob replaces the data;
Atomic Condition (2): it was revised after reviewed;
Atomic Condition (3): it was re-submitted on Wednesday;
Bob
upload1 a1v1 submit1
a1v2replace1
uinput gupload 
gsubmit 
uinput 
c 
Alice
c 
review1
a2v1
revise1
a2v2
a1v3
grade1
a4v1
append1
a4v2
review2
a3v1
c 
Bob
greview 
uinput 
greview 
c 
Alice
 C 
Bob
c 
Alice usrc 
ggrade 
greplace 
c 
Alice
Bob
c 
 
uref 
u     used 
g     was Generated By 
c     was Controlled By 
a     assignment 
v     version 
attri  was Attributed By 
gappend 
uinput 
uinput 
Sundayattri 
30/4/2018
attri 
1/1/2018attri 
Monday attri 
Target Policy
Section
Access Control
 Policy Section
～
¬ ∇ 
t1 t2 p2 p3
p1
(THE EXAMPLE PROVENANCE GRAPH) (THE EXAMPLE POLICIES)
Figure 7: A Case Study
A request was sent to access a piece of data in a database, the server retrieves its provenance graph and makes a
decision based on the sample policy. Begin with the target section, referring to the provenance graph, we can see Bob
uploaded the data “a1v1” and Alice submitted it. Hence, the results for the atomic target (1) is total match 1T . Next, in
the provenance graph, the data was reviewed at Monday but graded at 30/5/2018 instead of 30/4/2018, which indicates
that the provenance graphs partial match the atomic target (2), where its result is 0T . The results of the atomic targets
were merged by the operator unionsq. Referring the Table 4.2 of this paper, 1T unionsq0T = 1T . It shows that the given provenance
graph matches that target section, therefore, we move to the access control policy section. Similarly, as Bob did not
replace the data, the result for atomic conditions (1) is ⊥P which merged by the operator 4 with outputs of atomic
condition (2) ∩ atomic condition (3). The final output of this policy is 1P . The request to access the data was accepted.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a fine-grained provenance-based access control policy model by defining atomic condition
and policy algebras, which utilise provenance as conditions to determine accessibility of data. Specifically, several
types of atomic targets are provided in this paper. Path atomic target takes attributes in provenance as conditions,
which implies that if certain operations are executed on the targeted data, these attributes determine that the operation
can or cannot access the data. Associated atomic target takes both attributes of provenance and requests as conditions.
This indicates that if the requestor has performed certain operations on the targeted data, it can or can not be accessed.
Each atomic target takes the form of a string of vertices, where each vertex is defined by a quaternion of attributes.
Moreover, the results for an atomic target of our provenance-based access control policy is one element in a four-
valued set. New logic operators to merge the four-valued results are proposed in the paper. The test experiment shows
that our model can correctly deal with the request.
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